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Since the introduction of lawyers for children into child welfare proceed-
ings, lawyers have struggled with how to determine their child clients' best
interests. There has been widespread recognition that lawyers bring no particu-
lar expertise to such assessments. A sense of humility has led to calls to avoid
imposing lawyers' subjective values on their clients. A desire for fairness has
led to calls that like cases be treated alike. Sensitivity to the race, class, gender,
and culture dynamics of today's child welfare system has led to awareness of
the dangers of imposing our particular perspectives-however well inten-
tioned-on clients.1 Yet while there is much discussion of what to avoid doing
as an attorney for children, still the pressing question remains of what lawyers
can and should do to serve their young clients' interests. The Recommenda-
tions of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families, offer an
important, and-all-too-frequently ignored starting point: if you want to figure
out what is best for a child, ask her parents.
Outside the legal realm, this starting point is so widely accepted, it goes with-
out saying. What to get a child for her birthday? Ask her parents. What to
feed a child when you're babysitting? What time to put her to bed? Ask the
parents. If a teacher is concerned about a child's behavior in school? Consult
the parents. Yet as soon as a child is subject to a court proceeding, the instinct
to turn to the adults who know the child best and care most about her falls
* Assistant Adjunct Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law, and
Co-Director of the NYU Family Defense Clinic. I thank Marty Guggenheim for comments
on an earlier draft and for so much great conversation that has influenced my thinking on this
topic. I also thank Annette Appell, Jim Corsiglia, and Erik Pitchal for helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
1 See, e.g, JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEED-
INGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS §§ 10-1 to 10-8 (1997) (cautioning against law-
yers for children imposing race, class and gender biases and describing strategies to avoid
doing so); Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceed-
ings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles Are Required, 34 FAM. L. Q., 441, 442, 447 (2000) (noting
concern regarding children's attorneys' lack of expertise in assessing best interests and the
danger of their making subjective value judgments); Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The
Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699,
1705 (1996) (noting concern regarding lawyers' lack of expertise in assessing best interests);
Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV., 1399, 1414-15 (1996) (arguing that like cases should be treated alike and
that the personalities and values of individual lawyers should not influence case outcomes).
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away. It is easy to understand why this is so in the child welfare context.2
Child welfare proceedings are the extreme cases in which we allow the govern-
ment to intervene in the protected realm of child rearing because these are, by
definition, the cases in which there is concern that parents are not fulfilling
their minimum responsibilities. We generally defer to parents because we
assume that the vast majority of parents are fit. Once there is reason to believe
they are unfit, the usual deference no longer seems justified. These are excep-
tional situations in that we are focused on protecting the children from their
parents. Consequently, they are the times when we do not automatically turn to
parents to say what is best for their kids.
Yet, however counter-intuitive, even in child welfare cases, parents in fact
remain the best ones to gauge children's interests. They are the best source of
information available to courts, to foster care agencies, and to children's law-
yers. There are exceptions, as will be explored below, but the exceptions are
narrower than is commonly recognized. That parents may have fallen below
our minimum standards for caretaking-as serious as that is-does not change
the fact that they are best situated to determine their children's interests. That
parents are accused of neglect or abuse should not cause us to abandon the
many common sense reasons that we normally turn to parents when decisions
need to be made for children. Typically parents know their children's needs,
desires, strengths, weaknesses, personality, and history in nuanced ways that
others cannot come close to approaching. In virtually all instances parents also
care more deeply about their children's well-being than anyone else. The rela-
tionship is the least transitory of human relationships; indeed, parents' invest-
ment in children's well being is life-long. When parents fail to meet minimum
standards, we must as a community step in to protect their children. But in
protecting children, we need not deprive them of the great benefits that even
troubled parent-child relationships can provide.
Related to, but distinct from, these common sense reasons for acknowl-
edging that parents are best able to assess children's interests, are the legal
reasons. The United States Congress, every state legislature, and the United
States Supreme Court have indicated that the legal framework for state inter-
vention in family life requires that we leave child-rearing decisions to parents
except within narrowly carved exceptions. The exceptions are not justified by
claims that better decisions could be made by someone other than the parent,
not even where a majority has democratically determined that particular deci-
sions are contrary to children's interests. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been
quite clear that "[i]n light of [the] extensive precedent, it cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children."3 Although the legal authority given to parents is
2 It is less obvious why parents are not treated as the experts on children's interests when
children are involved in delinquency and status offense cases. But those issues are beyond
the scope of this paper.
I Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (drawing this conclusion after a discussion
citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
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based to some extent on our belief that they will generally make the best deci-
sions for their child, we give them that authority understanding that they will
not always do so. Thus, parents have a legally protected right to make deci-
sions for their children even when we may not agree they are doing what is best
for the child.
Child abuse and neglect cases are the exceptions in which we allow the
state to overcome the parents' constitutionally protected authority. Only after
the state has proven that a parent's decision-making presents serious, imminent
danger to a child, do we allow the state to intervene. As important as this
limitation on parental authority is, however, it is the beginning, rather than the
end of understanding the legal constraints on state intervention. The law does
not treat parental authority and state authority over children as being an all-or-
nothing choice. Rather, we allow the government to intervene in limited ways
and generally restrict the state imposition on parental authority specifically to
preventing the parent from harming the child. Our entire foster care system is
based on the understanding that even when the extreme intervention of taking a
child from her parents' care is justified, it is a temporary intervention. Parental
rights remain carefully protected even in the most serious cases of parental
misconduct unless and until an even greater showing justifies the ultimate state
intervention of termination of parental rights.4 As the Supreme Court put it:
"The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State." 5
In other words, the law takes a graduated approach-working as a rheo-
stat, not an on-off switch 6-in allowing the state to impose on parental author-
ity. Rights of parental authority remain with parents except as specifically
abrogated based on a showing of danger to the child. Although there is, of
course, variation among the specifics of states' child welfare law, there is a
universal underlying principle akin to the "least restrictive alternative" princi-
ple of commitment law: we allow the government to intervene in otherwise
protected areas only to the extent necessary, reserving as much as possible of
the right at issue to the individual.7 This principle has particular ramifications
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); and Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
4 See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (holding that due process requires a showing by clear and
convincing evidence to terminate parental rights where there was an earlier finding that the
parent was neglectful).
5 Id. at 753.
6 Thanks to Marty Guggenheim for this metaphor.
7 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding that the state cannot
constitutionally confine a mentally ill person where less restrictive alternatives are availa-
ble); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983), supplemented by 712 F.2d 1428
(D.C. Cir. 1983) ("To justify restriction of constitutionally protected activity, the govern-
ment must do more than show that such curtailment would promote, in a particular case,
compelling governmental interests. '[I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those
goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the
way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means."" Id. at 607
(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (alterations in original))); see also
Jessica E. Marcus, The Neglectful Parens Patriae: Using Child Protective Laws to Defend
the Safety Net, - N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming) (arguing that the least
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for children's lawyers who are involved in the exceptional cases in which some
government intervention is allowed.
Just as we temper state intervention by allowing only the minimum intru-
sion necessary, the authority granted children's attorneys is limited as well.
They must serve child clients' interests without overreaching to claim authority
that has not been transferred to them. Consequently, even in those situations in
which attorneys are required to assess children's best interests, they are bound
to act within principled constraints. 8 Few children's attorneys would disagree,
yet the nature of the proper constraints remains quite murky, leaving individual
attorneys in an extremely uncomfortable position. They understand they are
ethically constrained, but are unclear on the constraints. The graduated
approach that the Constitution takes to infringements of parents' rights, how-
ever, goes a long way toward clarifying the constraining principles that govern
children's attorneys and resolving the discomfort. Attorneys need not and
should not take on responsibilities for which they are not trained and which
they do not have the resources to meet. Attorneys are not required to compre-
hensively assess children's best interests-an impossible task given the con-
cerns that such assessments not be subjective, not impose the attorneys race,
class, gender or cultural biases, and not result in similar cases being treated
differently. Rather than take on this impossible task, attorneys should ensure
that the assessment of best interests is located where it should be. Most of the
time, for all the common sense and legal reasons discussed above, that is with
the parents, even when there has been a showing of unfitness.
Of course, there are times, discussed below, when direct legal conflicts
preclude children's attorneys from deferring to parents' views. But to identify
parents as the best assessors of children's interests is not to turn over the direc-
tion of the representation. It is, as the recommendation of the UNLV Confer-
ence suggests, to seek out and give special weight to parents' views and to
actively encourage courts to respect those views whenever possible.
There is widespread acknowledgment that parents' and children's interests
are inherently intertwined. But to reach the goal of the UNLV Conference of
moving beyond lip service in our commitment to serving children through rec-
ognizing the importance of their families9 requires establishing principled,
restrictive alternative doctrine requires states to provide financial assistance to families when
that would prevent the need to place children in foster care).
I As discussed in the text below, see supra text accompanying notes 13-14, the UNLV Con-
ference reaffirmed the ethical principle that the legal representation of children should be
client-directed whenever possible and, when not possible, attorneys should represent clients'
legal interests. Report of the Working Group on the Role of the Family, 6 NEV. L.J. 616, pt.
IV.D (2006); Report of the Working Group in the Best Interests of the Child and the Role of
the Attorney, 6 NEV. L.J. 682, pt. 1 (2006). See also Recommendations of the Conference on
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 FOROHAM L. REV. 1301, 1309-10
(1996). This Article does not advocate expanding the circumstances under which an attor-
ney would formulate a position based on an assessment of best interests. Rather, it seeks to
offer guidance to attorneys who are required to assess best interests. See Report of the
Working Group on the Best Interests of Child and the Role of the Attorney, supra at 682,
(2006) (noting that many children's attorneys are required by law to assess the best interests
of their clients and stressing need to develop guidance for those attorneys, without endorsing
a best-interests model of representation).
9 Report of the Working Group on the Role of the Family, supra note 8, at pt. I.
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practical guidelines that allow children's attorneys to work within their exper-
tise and within clearly articulated legal constraints. This task becomes even
more important when we recognize that cases of state intervention into family
life are far from rare' and that the families at risk of intrusion are dispropor-
tionately poor and minority families.1 1 The UNLV Recommendation on giving
special weight to parents' assessments of best interests provides a significant
step in the right direction, one that deserves attention and further discussion as
we attempt to bring the Conference's broader aspirations into practice.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION: WHEN A CHILD CLIENT'S CAPACITY IS
DIMINISHED, CHILDREN'S ATTORNEYS SHOULD GIVE SPECIAL
WEIGHT TO PARENTS' ASSESSMENT OF BEST INTERESTS
Participants at the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Fami-
lies enthusiastically reaffirmed the important guidelines established at the pre-
cursor conference held at Fordham in 1995 ("Fordham Conference").1 2 Most
significantly, the participating practitioners and scholars reaffirmed the princi-
ple that lawyers for children are ethically required to have their clients' direct
representation.' 3 At the same time, conference participants agreed that it was
crucial to acknowledge the current constraints under which lawyers for children
practice and the reality that in many jurisdictions lawyers for children are
expected, and often required by law, to advocate for their clients' best interests.
Consequently, one of the working groups was asked to focus specifically on
questions relating to best interests and the role of the attorney. 4 In that work-
ing group, we set out to use the combined expertise of the conferences' practi-
tioners and scholars to devise practical guidance for lawyers who feel
constrained to determine their clients' best interests, as well as for those who
act in a more traditional lawyer role. 5
In developing protocols for lawyers who find themselves in a position of
assessing the best interests of their child clients, the Working Group on the Best
Interests of the Child and Role of the Attorney proposed, and the UNLV Con-
ference ultimately adopted, several recommendations which virtually all law-
yers for children would agree should guide a best-interests inquiry. These
io The most recent available federal government statistics show that there were an estimated
542,000 children in foster care in 2001. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2001 ESTIMATES AS OF MARCH
2003, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/tar/report8.pdf.
11 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2001).
12 Report of the Working Group on the Role of the Family, supra note 8, at 616; Report of
the Working Group in the Best Interests of the Child and the Role of the Attorney, supra note
8, at pt. I. See also, Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, supra note 8, at 1309-10.
13 Report of the Working Group in the Best Interests of the Child and the Role of the Attor-
ney, supra note 8, at pt. I.
14 1 was privileged to be part of the Working Group on the Best Interests of the Child and
the Role of Attorney. I am indebted to the other members of the group for insightful discus-
sion, spirited debate, and two days that were far more fun than I expected.
15 Report of the Working Group in the Best Interests of the Child and the Role of the Attor-
ney, supra note 8, at 883-87.
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recommendations usefully articulated principles to which most lawyers are
already committed, such as the need to obtain information from a variety of
sources, including expert evaluations when appropriate. 16 One of the recom-
mendations, however, represents a more significant challenge to current prac-
tice. The UNLV Conference recommended that when a child client has
diminished capacity, the attorney give special weight to the parents' assessment
of the child's best interests.'
7
This recommendation is closely linked to another: attorneys should adopt
positions requiring the least intrusive state intervention in family life.' 8 As
discussed above, the principle of minimizing state intrusion is one of the justifi-
cations for giving parents' views of best interests special weight. 19 At the same
time, it is important to see that the two recommendations are distinct. They
will often lead to the same result, but not always. When they conflict, the
principle that parents' views are to be specially weighted should be given prior-
ity. For example, we generally should try to place children with kin rather than
in stranger foster care in order to limit trauma to the children and state intrusion
into the family life. And, of course, most often parents prefer kinship place-
ments. But in those cases in which parents oppose a kinship placement, the
parents' right to make decisions regarding the children's care should be
paramount.
Incorporating parents' views not only tends to lead to the best decisions,
the very process of preserving the parents' decision-making role benefits the
children. This is true for a number of reasons. One is that to the extent that
role is abrogated, the decision-making authority inevitably falls to state actors,
such as judges and caseworkers.2 ° No matter how well intentioned, hardwork-
ing, and knowledgeable about their cases lawyers become, they will never be
the primary decisions-makers for their child clients. Lawyers will always have
to support the decision-making of either the parents or state actors playing the
parental role. The only alternative to having parents parent is to have the state
do so. It is important to be honest about this choice and make it with full
recognition that, however well motivated state actors might be, parenting is
something they are ill equipped to do.
Yet another reason to leave decision-making in parents' hands is that in
most cases in which we find parents unfit and children in need of alternate
caretakers, the children ultimately will be reunified with their parents. 2 For all
16 Id. at pt. II.A.3.a.
17 Id. at pt. II.A.3.e.
18 This recommendation, in turn, is closely linked to the recommendation that children's
attorneys protect their clients' legal interests. Id. at pt. II.A.3.f.
19 Indeed, the term "special weight" was used by the Supreme Court in one of its most
recent decisions upholding the principle that state intrusion in family life is limited by the
Constitution. In Troxel v. Granville the Court held that parents' assessments of children's
best interests must be given special weight even where this limits the ability of states to
facilitate something as widely valued as grandparent visitation. 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plu-
rality opinion).
20 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (2005).
21 See Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Child Welfare Outcomes
2002: Annual Report, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwoO2/chap-
ters/chapterthree2002.htm (indicating that reunification is the permanency goal achieved in a
majority of foster care cases).
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the emphasis on the importance of working to reunify families and using effec-
tive service planning to do so, a simple point is often forgotten: improving
parenting requires practicing parenting. Parenting skills simply cannot be
learned in a vacuum. A key component of planning for reunification is sup-
porting parents as they work to implement improved parenting. Most evident is
the need to maximize visitation and use it to provide parents with opportunities
to parent effectively.22 It is also important to maintain parents' involvement in
and responsibility for educational and medical care, particularly when children
have special needs. It is counterproductive to distance parents from these cru-
cial aspects of parenting when it is hoped and expected that they will resume
those responsibilities fully at the end of any out-of-home placement.
Even for families that will not ultimately be reunified (and, of course,
there is no way to predict definitively which families will be), the on-going
engagement of parents in permanency planning is advantageous. As Professor
Annette Appell has highlighted, involving parents in adoption planning offers
numerous benefits, including facilitating information sharing between the birth
and adoptive families and increasing children's comfort with adoptions, as well
as demonstrably increasing the stability of adoptions.2 3 In addition, recent
attention to the increasing numbers of young people who "age out" of foster
care to independent living, has raised awareness that it is important that these
young people maintain strong support systems. Research indicates that one
third of all children who are discharged from foster care to independent living
return to live with their families. 24 Consequently, regardless of the perma-
nency plan, the children's lawyer should try to keep parents as involved as
possible in the lives of their children and urge courts to do the same.
The recommendation concerning parents' role in assessing best interests
does set certain limits. Special weight is given to parents' views except when:
(1) a direct legal conflict exists, (2) the parent is incapacitated, or (3) heeding
the parent's views would expose a child to serious harm. These exceptions are
important, but they are also narrower than might be expected. Many of the
issues on which lawyers for children develop positions do not involve direct
legal conflicts with the parent. A direct legal conflict exists only when the
parent will be legally disadvantaged by a particular outcome. 25 The primary
22 See Marty Beyer, Parent-Child Visits as an Opportunity for Change, PREVENTION REP.
Spring 1999, at 2, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/%7Enrcfcp/publications/documents/
springl999.pdf (citing several research studies). Sonya J. Leathers, Parental Visiting and
Family Reunification: Could Inclusive Practice Make a Difference?, 81 CHILD WELFARE J.
595 (2002) available at http://www.aecf.org/publications/pdfs/cwla2.pdf (finding that visit-
ing frequency was a stronger predictor of reunification than parental substance abuse or
mental illness); Admin. for Children's Servs., City of New York, Implementation of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act, Part III: ACS Best Practice Guidelines for Family Visiting
Arrangements for Children in Foster Care, Dec. 19, 2000 [ hereinafter NYC Visiting Guide-
lines] available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/asfa-3.pdf.
23 Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collabora-
tive Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997 (1995).
24 Casey Family Programs, Outcomes for Youth Exiting Foster Care, June 19, 2001, www.
hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/outcomesforyouths-exiting_fostercare.pdf.
25 I emphasize that it is legal disadvantage that is at issue because the fact that a parent may
benefit from a particular outcome is not itself a reason that the child's lawyer should be
skeptical of the parent's position. The parent-child relationship is one in which the interests
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examples are the issue of whether a parent should be found to have neglected or
abused a child and the issue of whether parental rights should be terminated. In
these determinations, parents have an obvious legal interest in particular out-
comes (dismissals of the cases against them) that may be in conflict with the
children's legal interests.26 It is important, however, to keep in mind how
many of the issues on which children's lawyers take positions do not involve
such conflicts. That there has been neglect or abuse does not mean that the
interests of the parents and children thereafter conflict.
Unlike the traditional plaintiff-versus-defendant structure of litigation,
child welfare litigation always involves a third person, who is neither plaintiff
nor defendant. Thus the children's lawyer represents a client whose interests
are not inherently at odds with any particular party. Moreover, unlike most
litigation, which is backward looking, with factual disputes being about past
actions, child welfare cases are forward looking, involving as many decisions
about what is to happen going forward as about what has already happened.
Questions about whether neglect or abuse occurred end up being only a fraction
of the issues addressed by courts in child welfare proceedings. Often these are
the least contested issues, ending in settlement agreements. In many cases, the
most important and most conflicted issues upon which children's lawyers take
positions are the forward-looking issues on which there is no direct legal con-
flict and on which parents are particularly well suited to make assessments. A
few of the most important examples include decisions about: (i) where children
will be placed when not with parents; (ii) visitation; and (iii) various aspects of
the out-of-home care provided children.
Frequently important decisions must be made about where children will
reside while away from their parents. Sometimes the decision is between a
kinship and a non-kinship placement. At other times, questions arise about
which non-kinship foster care option best serves the children. These are all
decisions on which parents' view should be given special weight for all the
same reasons that parents generally have authority in child rearing. Moreover,
are uniquely bound together. Indeed, it is a wonderfully beneficial aspect of the relationship
that for a parent to behave altruistically in caring for a child is also self-serving (in that the
parent has an emotional investment in the child's well being and that caring for a child
facilitates the survival of one's progeny). In other words, it is a healthy, positive aspect of
parenting for parents to see their interests and their children's interests as aligned. Lawyers
for children are sometimes skeptical when a parent advocates something to benefit the child
that also would benefit the parent, but mutual benefit, by itself, is not a reason to question the
parent's assessment.
26 Of course, even on those issues, children's lawyers will sometimes take the position that
dismissal of the case against the parents is consistent with children's interests. The point is
that, unlike the many other issues discussed in the text, the lawyer will not favor a dismissal
solely on the basis of the parents' view of the issue. Children's lawyers may, however, still
incorporate the parents' views of what is best when formulating a position. For example, if a
parent argues that a neglect case against her should be resolved without a factual finding
against her (perhaps through a suspended judgment or an adjournment in contemplation of
dismissal), to the extent the rationale for that position is based on concerns for the child's
well being, they should be given special weight by the child's lawyer. If, for instance, the
parent is seeking a suspended judgment because that would avoid her having a record of
child maltreatment which would put her at risk of losing her employment, the lawyer should




there is additional justification for respecting parents' views on placement
issues due to the role of temporary caretakers in facilitating continued contact
between children and their parents. Such contact is a crucial element of the
state's obligation to work toward family reunification whenever possible and is
more likely to be advanced if parents' preferences regarding caretakers are
heeded.
Children's lawyers generally have an obligation to advocate for optimal
visiting plans that ensure as much continued contact between children and par-
ents as possible in settings conducive to maintaining family bonds.27 Thus, it is
particularly important that attorneys seek out parents' views on questions
regarding the frequency, location, and quality of visits.
Similarly, parents' views are entitled to deference on questions regarding
the nature of out-of-home care. Parents are best positioned and sometimes
have explicitly protected legal rights to make decisions regarding education,
religious training and medical care.2 8 All too often, these rights are ignored.
Parents' concerns regarding the care provided in foster homes, even including
concerns about possible abuse, frequently are disregarded. Such failures are as
much an infringement of children's rights as parents' rights. Children's law-
yers are obligated to fight for their clients' rights to have their parents' deci-
sion-making in these areas respected.
The second limitation in the Recommendation that children's attorneys
give special weight to parents' views is when there is parental incapacity. This
is an even narrower limitation. It applies only when incapacities are clearly
demonstrated and should be tailored to the specific incapacities identified.
Obviously, in the rare cases in which capacity is so impaired as to require a
guardian ad litem for the parent, the parent is likely to not have the usual ability
to assess a child's best interests. Far more frequently, parents' capacities are
limited in very specific ways that do not change the fact that they are generally
best situated to assess children's needs.
When, for instance, a parent has a substance abuse problem (one of the
most common reasons child protective services intervene in families29 ), the
parent's capacity is somewhat impaired, affecting the ability to make certain
judgments. But it is important to recognize that, though extremely serious, an
incapacity such as substance abuse does not extinguish the many advantages
parents have in assessing children's best interests; it limits them, and the weight
given their assessments should be limited commensurately. Children's lawyers
should not defer to a parent's judgment about the drug problem itself when that
27 Erik Pitchal & Chris Gottlieb, Family Values: How Children's Lawyers Can Help Their
Clients by Advocating for Parents, NACC CHILDREN'S LAW MANUAL, 2004, at 317, 327-30.
28 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009
(1979) ("[G]reat deference must be accorded a parent's choice as to the mode of medical
treatment to be undertaken and the physician selected to administer the same."); Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
29 Between one third and two thirds of child maltreatment cases involve substance abuse.
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judgment is impaired by addiction 3' and obviously should not defer to judg-
ments the parent makes while under the influence. But with respect to many
issues regarding children, parents will continue to be best situated to assess best
interests and, therefore, their views should continue to be prioritized. Here too,
the least restrictive principle should prevail, with lawyers deferring to parents
as much as possible in light of the particular incapacity. And children's law-
yers must be careful to resist the temptation to infer incapacity from the fact
that the lawyer might not agree with a parent's view. Incapacity that would
justify a lawyer not giving special weight to a parent's assessment of best inter-
ests must be incapacity that is demonstrated independent of the parent's assess-
ment itself.3"
The recommendation's third limitation on the need to give special weight
to parents' views is when doing so would expose children to serious harm.
Again, lawyers must be careful to tailor this limitation strictly to demonstrated
facts. The ethical guidelines on what constitutes harm sufficient to overcome
another obligation of lawyers are instructive. An attorney may only breach the
duty of confidentiality "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm."
'31 Simi-
larly, in order to decide that harm is a reason not to give special weight to a
parent's assessments of best interests, a lawyer must have reason to believe the
threatened harm is serious and imminent, not speculative. And the lawyer must
be careful not to draw conclusions outside her expertise.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATION
Professional participants in the child placement process ... are neither qualified nor
authorized to act with a parent's discretion and prerogatives.... The professionals'
challenge, as nonparents, is how to be caring without taking unwarranted control of
the life of the child for whom they do not and cannot take full responsibility. The
ability to locate the line between the usurper of parental authority and the caring
expert characterizes the good professional.3 3
30 An inability to acknowledge that one has a substance abuse problem is, of course, a
common feature of addiction. Thus, children's lawyers should not defer to parents on the
questions of whether requiring a drug program and abstinence are appropriate components of
a service plan. At the same time, those who have substance abuse problems often have a
better understanding of their service needs (e.g., what type of program would be most effec-
tive for them) than anyone else. Consequently, regardless of the limitations present, all of
those involved in service planning should continue to seek information from parents and
shape service plans to be responsive to their concerns.
31 The caution required of children's lawyers in these situations is similar to the caution
lawyers must exercise when determining whether child clients are capable of directing repre-
sentation. As one recommendation states, a lawyer may not infer incapacity from the fact
that the lawyer disagrees with the child's position. Report of the Working Group on the Best
Interests of the Child and the Role of the Attorney, supra note 8, at pt. II.A.
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002). See also ETHICS 2000 COMMIS-
SION, FEBRUARY 2002 ABA AMENDMENT TO MODEL RULES, R. 1.6(b)(1), (Future Crimes
Exception: "The new exception [to confidentiality] ... is focused on preventing serious,
imminent harms, and authorizes the revelation of client information when necessary to
accomplish its ends.").
33 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMEN-
TAL ALTERNATIVE 210 (1996).
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CHILDREN'S ATTORNEYS' OBLIGATIONS
One of the key purposes of the UNLV Conference was to provide guidance
to lawyers for children that would have practical value in the circumstances
under which lawyers for children actually work. Given the limited resources
currently available for the representation of children, and consequent heavy
caseloads, children's lawyers cannot possibly gather all information relevant to
determining their clients' interests. Moreover, lawyers must be cognizant of
the limitations of their expertise and risks of over-stepping their proper role.
The recommendation that children's lawyers give special weight to parents'
views offers children's lawyers a practical means to obtain information effi-
ciently and lower the risk of making assessments that impose attorneys' per-
sonal value judgments and disserve their child clients.3 4
How then does one go about implementing this recommendation? First,
lawyers for children must increase their communication with the parents of
their clients. There is no way to assess children's interests without speaking to
the most important individuals in their lives, which in the vast majority of cases
are the parents.35 Of course, there are ethical rules regarding communication
36 altoofethsruear
between lawyers and represented parties. But all too often these rules are
used as an excuse for children's lawyers to avoid acquiring information that is
crucial to making informed decisions about children's interests. The ethical
rules do not bar communication, they bar communication without the consent
of the attorney for the represented party.37 It is incumbent upon children's
lawyers to actively seek communication with parents in every case in which
communication would benefit the child clients. In other words, in nearly every
case.
In most cases, parents' attorneys should agree to at least some (and often
to a great deal of) communication because that will be in the parents' interests.
After all, one of the chief tasks of parents' attorneys is to help others in the
court process see their clients as individuals with strengths. Typically it will
serve both the parents' and the children's interests for the child's attorney to
learn not only the parent's positions, but the reasons for those positions. Take
two issues on which parents frequently have views different from the state:
whether the child should remain in a particular foster home and whether a child
should be on psychotropic medication.3 8 In such cases, it serves both the
child's interests and the parent's interests for the child's attorney to understand
3' As Erik Pitchal highlights in this volume, the UNLV Recommendations call on counsel
for children to offer more comprehensive representation, which may increase the risk of
attorneys over-reaching. Erik Pitchal, Buzz in the Brain and Humility in the Heart: Doing it
All, Without Doing Too Much, on Behalf of Children, 6 NEV. L.J. 1350, 1351 (2006). The
recommendation to give special weight to parents' assessments of best interests is one way
to address the concern he raises.
35 If other relatives are raising children when they come to the attention of the child welfare
system, the child's lawyer will need to communicate with that person as well as with the
biological parents.
36 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980); N.Y. STATE
BAR Assoc., THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (2002).
37 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1980).
38 Decisions to put children on psychotropic medication raise particularly controversial
questions. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kluger, Medicating Young Minds, TIME, Nov. 3, 2003, at 48;
Claudia Kalb, Drugged-Out Toddlers, NEWSWEEK, March 6, 2000, at 53; Joseph T. Coyle,
Psychotropic Drug Use in Very Young Children, JAMA, Feb. 23, 2000, at 1059. When
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the parent's specific concerns. Perhaps the parent sees side effects of medica-
tion or signs that a child has regressed in a certain placement-signals the law-
yer might otherwise miss. There is value in the information itself and there is
additional benefit in the child's lawyer seeing the parent demonstrate desirable
parenting traits through engagement with specific issues affecting the child.
Of course, parents' attorneys may wish to be present during the communi-
cation between children's attorneys and parents, and certainly have a right to
be. But that is not a reason for children's attorneys not to take full advantage of
opportunities to communicate. Moreover, it will frequently be in parents' inter-
ests for parents' attorneys to allow unfettered communication between their
clients and children's attorneys. Parents' attorneys often have good reason to
give permission for children's attorneys to speak to parents even without
requiring that the parents' attorney be present for every such conversation. Not
only does this ease logistics, it may build parents' credibility and allow them to
develop more positive relationships with their children's lawyers. Concerns
about protecting parents from making statements detrimental to their legal
interests may often be alleviated simply by parents' attorneys limiting permis-
sion to speak to their clients to specific topics and children's lawyers agreeing
to not discuss any allegations pending against the parents. Of course, parents'
attorneys will have to make decisions about the parameters of such permission
on a case-by-case basis. There may be risk in letting parents speak to their
children's attorneys; more often, there is greater risk in not permitting such
communication.
Direct communication between children's lawyers and parents is rare in
many jurisdictions and requests by children's lawyers to communicate with
parents may be met with skepticism. Changing this aspect of court culture
would benefit all involved. The need to make child welfare proceedings less
adversarial is widely recognized. Children's lawyers can make concrete pro-
gress in that direction through this simple step. Once lawyers for parents have
some positive experiences with children's lawyers who are genuinely interested
in understanding parents' views and limiting state abrogation of parental
authority, trust is likely to increase. Over time, increasing communication can
lead to greater openness and in turn to even more communication.
Children's attorneys should seek parents' input on virtually all issues on
which attorneys will take positions that are not directed by the child clients.
Some of the issues discussed above will deserve parental involvement in almost
every case. It is the rare case in which a child's lawyer could reach a valid
determination of her client's interests regarding visitation or the quality of care
in out-of-home placements, including educational and medical care and any
services the child might need, without soliciting the parents' input. These
issues are often best addressed outside the courtroom and, to the greatest extent
possible, children's lawyers should participate in out-of-court conferences and
service plan meetings. At a minimum, however, if children's attorneys are not
involved in developing service plans outside of court, they should be obtaining
parents' views on these plans before taking positions in court.
issues regarding the care of children are so highly contested, i.e., when there is no consensus
on them in the population at large, there is heightened justification to defer to parents.
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Whether or not children's attorneys have direct communication with par-
ents, they can ensure that parents' assessments of children's interests are given
special weight by ensuring that parents' voices are meaningfully heard in court.
Children's attorneys serve their clients by inquiring on the record about par-
ents' positions on any issues before the court. Moreover, children's attorneys
should advocate for courts to solicit parents' assessments of children's interests
and for courts to give those assessments the deference the law requires. In
other words, children's attorneys should protect their clients by protecting chil-
dren's rights to have their parents' decision-making authority respected.39
To say that children's lawyers should support courts' respecting parents'
rights is not to say the lawyers' obligation ends there. Children's lawyers have
an obligation to actively pursue their clients' interests in specific issues as well,
as their general interest in parental decision-making. All too often children's
lawyers remain mute on, or provide pro forma support for, applications by par-
ents that would benefit the children. Children's lawyers should proactively
pursue any position of parents that would serve children's interests. This obli-
gation is particularly significant given the advantages children's attorneys often
enjoy. For a number of reasons, including that their clients are sympathetic and
the focus of the courts' concern, children's lawyers often have greater credibil-
ity with courts than other lawyers in other roles. An application by a children's
attorney is often more likely to be granted by courts than the same application
by a parents' attorney. Therefore children's attorneys cannot simply wait for
parents' attorneys to make applications that would serve both sets of clients.4 °
If the Recommendation that lawyers for children give special weight to
parents' assessments of best interests is to be of the practical value intended, we
must be frank about the challenges of implementing it. The Recommendation
requires children's lawyers to defer at times to views with which they may
disagree. Indeed, the Recommendation involves deferring to people whose
judgment or behavior sometimes has been found wanting in some way. This is
not always easy to do. But the law is clear. We do not only allow parents to
make the right decisions for their children. We allow them discretion to make
bad decisions with which we disagree. This commitment is so important in our
system that the rights of parental authority remain constitutionally protected
even after parents have been found to have neglected or abused their children.4
Thus, though sometimes counterintuitive-what adult does not want to do
what she or he believes is best for a child?-an attorney's obligation is not to
figure out what is best for a child client, but to figure out where that answer
lies. The children's lawyer serves her clients' interests not by doing all she can
to make the best possible assessment of children's needs, but by ensuring that
those who should be making the assessment get to do so. We have long
expected this kind of discipline from judges. We allow judges a great deal of
39 See Martin Guggenheim, supra note 1 (arguing that the role of children's attorneys stems
from the substantive rights of child clients).
40 See Pitchal & Gottlieb, supra note 27, at 324-25; see also In re Jamie T.T., 599 N.Y.S.2d
892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for a child client where
the attorney took on a passive role rather than actively advocating when supporting the
position of the state).
41 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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power on the understanding that they will impose self-restraint to limit their
decision-making to explicitly granted authority. The rule of law requires that
such limits be respected, distinct from the value of any particular outcome in a
case. We must demand as much restraint of children's lawyers. The powerful
role they have, heightened when their clients are not capable of fully directing
representation, brings with it a responsibility to ensure that child-rearing deci-
sions are made to the greatest extent possible by parents.
